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ABSTRACT
We analyze the role of privatization in creating a constituency for economic reform, markets, and
democratic institutions, focusing on the Czech Republic.

Drawing on a 1996 survey, we

examine the 1459 respondents’ opinions on reforms, economic policies and systems, the
legitimacy of transition, and democratic values. Using ordered probit estimation, we find that
receiving property through restitution is strongly associated with support for reform and markets.
Concerning voucher privatization, we find positive effects for participants retaining shares, but
little impact of participation alone. Our simulations suggest that policy designs have substantial
consequences for citizens’ support of reforms, markets, and democracy.

1. INTRODUCTION
The principal problem faced by a politician embarking upon a course of economic reform
is how to ensure popular support through the long, uncertain, and frequently painful process of
policy enactment and implementation. Serious economic reforms may impose large short-term
costs — in production, unemployment, and living standards — even if they improve the common
lot in the longer run. Thus, standard analyses of the political economy of reform hypothesize
that public opinion will follow aggregate economic performance along a “J-curve” trajectory, so
that popular support declines rapidly as reforms take hold, recovering only as the economy
rebounds (e.g., Przeworski 1991).
This situation appears to pose an enormous dilemma for the reform- minded policymaker.
If forced to pay too much attention to public sentiment, he/she might be deterred from the painful
actions necessary to put the national economy on sound footing.

However, “insulating”

economic policymaking from popular reaction may inhibit the development of democratic
institutions, hence the dilemma of the “dual transition” in countries facing simultaneous
imperatives for economic and political reform. 1 Frequent recommendations are heard that the
reformer must act quickly, taking advantage of a “window of opportunity” (Lipton and Sachs
1990) or “period of extraordinary politics” (Balcerowicz 1994) before public opinion begins to
sour, but policies require time to enact, implement, and bear fruit. Moreover they are not always
irreversible.

Thus, even quick action and willingness to sacrifice one’s career will not

necessarily save the policymaker’s reform program.
In this paper, we argue that finding a solution to this conundrum demands a recognition
that reform packages ha ve multiple dimensions and that popular support for reform is sensitive to
1

See, e.g., Encarnacion (1996), Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Offe (1991), Terry (1993), or Pereira,
Maravall, and Przeworski (1993).
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the micropolitical-economic details of policy design. Holding constant any aggregate economic
effects (which, at least in the short run, are probably not much under the influence of the
policymaker), we claim that the distributive impact of reforms, the process through which they
are implemented, and the political rhetoric by which they are explained affect the way individual
citizens experience them. Our hypothesis is that those experiences influence attitudes towards
reform, economic policies and systems, perceptions of legitimacy of the economic transition, and
democratic values. In particular, by “sweetening” the bitter medicine of structural reforms with
policies that draw in popular participation and create immediate, widespread benefits, the
policymaker may be able to increase the sustainability and irreversibility of reforms even during
a period of economic dislocation.
The paper develops this argument by investigating the role of privatization policy design
in the Czech Republic, the country to adopt the earliest and most extensive version of “mass
privatization,” involving a large share of both state-owned assets and the population. Unlike
unemployment and growth, the focus of much of the literature on the political economy of
transition, privatization is more clearly a policy instrument of the government: within some
limits, policymakers have been able to determine many aspects of the process. Privatization was
also a central linchpin in the transition policy of the Czech (and earlier, the Czechoslovak)
government. Whatever the economic benefits or shortcomings of the policy design, which have
been the subject of much debate that is not our purpose here to join, we draw attention in this
paper to the program’s political impact through its effects on popular support for the reform
process. 2

2

Several economic aspects of the Czech privatization strategy and its impact on the corporate governance
of firms have come under criticism, as we discuss below. A complete economic evaluation of the
program awaits the passage of time and the collection of extensive data on the privatized firms. For
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The political and economic attitudes of citizens in post-Communist countries have been
the subject of considerable prior research, 3 and there is a voluminous literature on the design of
privatization policies. Discussions of the potential political effects of alternative privatization
strategies also abound, both in the popular press and in some analyses of postsocialist countries.4
It is striking, however, that there appears to be a relative paucity of research that directly relates
the attitudes held by an individual to his or her experience of privatization policies, ex post.5
Our study contributes to filling this gap by identifying the politically relevant details of
Czech privatization and the possible channels through which they may affect popular support for
reform, by developing an estimable analytical framework within which hypotheses about the
privatization/popular support relationship may be tested, by designing a questionnaire to collect
the relevant information from a large sample of Czech individuals, and by presenting empirical
estimates of the size and statistical significance of the hypothesized relationships using the
survey data. The results represent explicit tests of the potential political feedback from economic
policy design, a subject much discussed in the literature on the political economy of reform but
for which there is little evidence at the level of individual attitudes.

preliminary studies, see Claessens and Djankov (1999), Coffee (1996), Earle et al. (1994), or Harper
(2002).
3
See, e.g., Duch (1993, 1995), Earle and Rose (1996), Earle et al. (1997), Evans and Whitefield (1995),
Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), Hough (1994), Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994), Mishler and Rose
(1996), Przeworski (1996), Reisinger et al. (1994), Shiller et al. (1992), Stokes (1996), Vecernik (1996),
and Whitefield and Evans (1994).
4
See, e.g., Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995) for Russia, Earle et al. (1994) for Central Europe, or
Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) for a wide-ranging discussion.
5
Voting studies, including Fidrmuc (1996), Grigoriev, Nagaev, and Woergoetter (1994), and Mateju
(1995), have examined some economic experiences as determinants of political preferences, but the focus
is usually on unemployment or the data is aggregate. Colton (1996, 2000) examines the impact of
enrollment in the housing privatization program, unemployment, and some characteristics of one’s
employer on voting and attitudes in Russia. Outside of the postcommunist world, scholars have studied
the impact of privatization experiences on political attitudes and voting in Great Britain [see, e.g.,
Saunders (1995), Garrett (1994), Studlar, McAllister, and Ascui (1990)].
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Finally, the paper contributes more generally to methodologies for evaluating the impact
of a determinant of interest on a limited dependent variable, such as the public opinion indexes
used in this paper. When the dependent variable is categorical, coefficients from appropriate
estimation techniques, such as ordered probit, are difficult to interpret directly. Our method of
policy simulations provides a measure in terms of the elasticity of movement of individuals
across the original categories of the dependent variable, and may be generalized to analogous
problems with any limited dependent variable.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses some relevant aspects of the political
economy of economic reform, and Section 3 analyzes political aspects of the Czech restitution and
voucher privatization programs. Section 4 elaborates our argument about the responsiveness of attitudes
to experiences with privatization, while Section 5 presents a statistical model of attitude determination
and of the policy simulations we use to estimate responsiveness of attitudes to privatization experiences.
Section 6 describes our data, and Section 7 presents the results of our estimations and simulations,
including a discussion of possible problems of endogeneity and robustness. Section 8 draws some
conclusions and wider implications of our analysis.

2. THE DEBATE ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ECONOMIC REFORM
Economic policymakers have long wrestled with the challenge of implementing
economic reforms with an uncertain potential for long-term gains in the face of public opposition
to their short-term costs. The dilemma has been particularly acute in the countries of postCommunist Central and Eastern Europe, where democratization (if not full democracy) preceded
the implementation of policies to marketize and privatize the economy.
Although the debates among policymakers, their advisors, and scholars as to the best way
to manage the dual transition have had a number of dimensions, it is useful to divide the

4

participants into two groups depending on the choice variable on which they focus. One group
of observers has focused on political institutions, with some arguing that more insulation, and
others that more democratization, is necessary to push through necessary economic reforms. A
second group has taken the pace of economic reform as the choice variable, with some
advocating radical “shock therapy” and others favoring gradual reform.
Within the first group, focused on political institutio ns, the argument for protection of the
reform process from political forces has originated from two related fears. First, the absence of
an established constituency for reform might produce a backlash when the inevitable short-term
costs come to pass. Thus, the reform process could falter and already- implemented reforms
might be reversed prematurely. To counter that risk, a “liberal authoritarianism” (Jowitt 1992) or
other “insulation” (Nelson 1993) of the polity from the public may be necessary. Second, the
presence of already organized vested interests tied to the ancien regime endangers reform.
Logically, then, a “strong state” able to act independently of those interests might be the only
force able to enact the necessary measures (McFaul 1995).
In contrast, some observers see greater democratization as the only way to sustain
progress on economic reform. Technocratic and elitist decision- making alienate the public from
the reform process; hence, consultation with and participation by the public (“concertation”)
should be pursued (Pereira, Maravall, and Przeworski 1993). Further, disproportionate political
influence by early winners who capture rents from incomplete reforms threatens to establish a
“partial reform equilibrium.” Only countervailing pressure from the broader public can push
policymakers beyond that stage (Hellman 1998).
In contrast to those who debate the pace of political opening, those who focus on the
speed of reform tend to take economic reform itself as endogenous and political constraints as
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exogenous. Within this latter group, the typical argument for rapid reform is that there exists a
“period of extraordinary politics” (Balcerowicz 1994) or “breakthrough period” (Aslund 1995)
immediately after the downfall of the old regime when the public is generally accepting of
reform and vested interests are disorganized. As this period will not last for long, the reformist
politician should take maximum advantage of the moment to drive through as many reforms as
possible (see e.g., Lipton and Sachs 1990, and Sachs 1994). 6

Proponents of this approach

generally argue that rapid reform along all fronts results in a quick turnaround (World Bank
1996; Aslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996), perhaps because of complementarities among the
different elements of reform (Friedman and Johnson 1995).
Others see risks in moving quickly. Individuals react slowly to new incentives, and
institutions evolve gradually over time. A rapid change in economic policy might therefore
result in economic collapse and concomitant loss of public support (Murrell 1993). Further, the
networks of firms and markets necessary for a functioning capitalist economy do not exist in
post-Communist countries and will take time to develop (e.g., Cohen and Schwartz 1992, and
Kornai 1990). When compounded with heterogeneity in agents’ discount rates, the politically
optimal reform speed can be lower than that in an economy with a benevolent dictator (Lian and
Wei 1998). Alternatively, economic actors respond quickly to new incentives, but negative
externalities and imperfect markets increase social adjustment costs (see e.g., Dewatripont and
Roland 1992, and Aghion and Blanchard 1994).
Most of these models share a view of economic reform as inevitably causing short-term
pain to the general population, though specific sectors or individuals might benefit immediately.
The key political question of economic reform is then how to manage the backlash from that
6

See also Martinelli and Tommasi (1997) for a theoretical model (with discussion of Latin American
reform) arguing that only radical reform can overcome vested interests when governments are unable to
precommit.

6

pain. In contrast (and cognizant that we are not doing full justice to the subtleties of many of the
arguments presented above), we believe it important to emphasize that economic reform is
inherently multidimensional and that micropolitical-economic details matter.

While some

economic policies impose political costs, others can increase support for reform. In particular,
policymakers in formerly Communist countries have the opportunity to distribute state-owned
property in a way that builds constituencies for reform, rather than merely relying on patience
and the “thin reed of ideological commitment.”7 In contrast to Latin America and Asia, where
such opportunities may be more limited and growth must be relied upon to ensure political
support (Haggard and Kaufman 1995), politicians in post-Communist countries literally have the
wealth of the nation at their disposal.
How that wealth is used may determine whether the political gains from privatization are
“tactical,” conferring short-term political advantage, or “systemic,” causing enduring change in
attitudes, incentives, and the constellation of political interest groups (Feigenbaum and Henig
1994).8 In this paper, we focus on changes in attitudes towards economic reform, economic
policies and systems, democratic institutions, and questions of political legitimacy. Many of
these attitudes are of the sort that would need to change for privatization to have a systemic
impact. Whether such attitudes endure, however, is a topic we leave for further research. Our
immediate focus is on the design of privatization policies to provide “the spoonful of sugar that

7

This is Fish’s (1998) characterization of others' arguments. Fish argues in contrast that the outcome of
early elections determined the success of economic reform in post-Communist countries, with those
countries that elected reformers pursuing economic reforms that outlasted the reformers' later electoral
defeats. In this paper we emphasize a particular mechanism through which such constituency-building
might be accomplished.
8
Feigenbaum and Henig’s (1994) typology of privatization strategies, which also includes “pragmatic”
privatizations with little connection to the political process, refers to privatization movements in Western
Europe and the U.S., but is nevertheless useful in analyzing privatization in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union.

7

helps the medicine go down”: to blunt the backlash from initial reforms and to increase support
for nascent market and democratic institutions.

3. PRIVATIZATION DESIGN AND POLITICAL IMPACT IN THE CZECH
REPUBLIC
The public justification for the design of a privatization policy is usually couched in
terms of economic efficiency, but this article focuses instead on its potential political impact.9
The most obvious impact on an individual concerns whether she wins or loses from the
redistribution, and the choice of the set of winners and losers must be reckoned as the first-order
political consequence of the policy. As elaborated below in Section 4, however, the effect of
privatization on an individual’s political attitudes may not be determined exclusively by the
value of the property he/she receives through the program (that is, by simple self- interest), but
may also be a function of the details of the program’s design and the rhetoric through which
national leaders attempt to “sell” it to the citizenry. We argue that important elements of the
program’s design and the discourse surrounding it include factors such as transparency, appeals
to and perceptions of fairness (in process as well as outcome), the nature of citizen participation,
and the way in which the program is linked to other parts of a package of reforms. This section
analyzes the two main Czech privatization programs – restitution and voucher privatization – in
this light, in order to motivate our hypothesis tha t these programs may have affected the
perceptions and attitudes of Czech individuals. 10

9

See Vickers and Yarrow (1991) for an overview of the economics of privatization.
See Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Earle (1993), Mladek (1993), or Earle et al. (1994) for more details on
Czech privatization policies.
10

8

Restitution
The Czech Republic had one of the largest programs of real property restitution of any
formerly communist country. The ability of the reform government that was newly elected in
1990 to enact such a program may have been related to the particular history of the Czech
Republic under socialism. Given that the Czechoslovak state was the owner of almost all assets
in 1989, unlike countries such as Hungary and Poland where there had already been significant
decentralization of property rights, there were relatively few logistical and political obstacles to
returning property to its previous owners. 11
Even if the current property rights were relatively clear (because they were held by the
state), the idea of returning specific assets was controversial when first discussed in 1990–1991.
Many objected that doing so would lead to administrative gridlock and slow down the overall
privatization process, as citizens battled over assets whose pre- nationalization titles were unclear.
Proponents, on the other hand, asserted that the program would spark the development of a new
entrepreneurial class, contributing to capital formation and economic growth. Although it was
not so clearly enunciated, the government may have also hoped that restitution of tangible assets
would create a grateful, loyal constituency that would support the mass privatization and other
policies. 12
At the same time, a significant program of restitution (or compensation) obviously
carried significant political risk, in that the majority of the population, receiving no direct
benefits, could become resentful of what might be perceived as special treatment for a privileged

11

The program was enacted in 1990 and 1991, before the split-up of the Czechoslovak Federation. After
December 1992, it was continued in each republic separately. See Stark (1992), Earle, Frydman, and
Rapaczynski (1993) for a discussion of the differing initial conditions and resulting path dependence for
the design of privatization policies in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
12
Returning specific assets rather than providing monetary compensation also aided transparency of the
process, in that it avoided disputes over the valuation of assets that had been expropriated.

9

minority. The government ultimately made the case for the program by arguing that the return of
confiscated property was the only fair thing to do. The property had been unjustly expropriated;
now it had to be returned. Moreover, the government played on the widespread sense of guilt
and shame over four decades of socialism, implying that restitution would offer some form of
expiation. By framing the issue in this way, the government likely hoped that they could avoid
alienating the majority of citizens who would receive no property through restitution, even while
they enlisted the support of the minority who would.
The program’s political impact was further increased by restricting eligibility for
restitution to resident citizens (or their heirs) from whom nonfinancial assets had been
nationalized after February 25, 1948. Restriction to residents deflected the possible backlash that
might have resulted if foreigners were the primary beneficiaries, while the requirement that
restituents be citizens meant that only voters would benefit. The cut-off date was rationalized as
the beginning of Communist Party control of Czechoslovakia, but it served to exclude two large
groups dispossessed during the war and immediate postwar periods: Jews and Sudeten Germans.
Sorting out the claims from these groups would no doubt have been complicated, but the
consequence of excluding these groups was to increase the government’s internal political
benefits from the program.
Voucher Privatization
The voucher program was the centerpiece of privatization policies and, arguably, the
principal impetus for transition in the Czech Republic. While subsequently imitated in various
forms by governments in a number of other East European countries, the design of the program
was untested and considered radical when championed in 1991 by Vaclav Klaus, then Finance
Minister and later Prime Minister. Under the plan, the Czech government distributed the bulk of

10

the shares in corporatized enterprises to the Czech citizenry in exchange for vouchers. In each of
two “waves” (the first in 1992, the second in 1993), any resident citizen over the age of 18 was
eligible to acquire state property by first purchasing a voucher booklet, and then using the 1000
voucher “points” either to bid directly for company shares or to invest indirectly by becoming a
shareholder in a privatization intermediary, one of the so-called “investment privatization funds”
(IPFs). Thus were transferred the bulk of the shares in 1,664 large state enterprises, including
much of Czech manufacturing industry. 13
In approaching the design of the program, policymakers had to make a number of
decisions that had potentially large political implications. One choice concerned whether to give
special advantages to certain categories of individuals. Most privatization programs in Eastern
Europe have provided shares free or at preferential prices to managers and employees of the
companies being privatized. Although this approach is sometimes argued to reduce opposition to
privatization within these companies (e.g., Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1995), it risks angering
the disfavored members of the population who work in less valuable or nonprivatizing
companies.

The Czech program gave no group such preferences, instead providing equal

opportunity for each adult citizen (i.e., voter) to participate.
Another design decision with implications for both the economic and political
consequences of the program concerned the price charged to citizens for participation. Setting
the price involved a tradeoff. A high price, and thus low participation, would increase the
likelihood of sound corporate governance through greater concentration of ownership and could
raise the value of the transfer in the eyes of participants. A low price and high participation, on
the other hand, offered the possibility of creating a constituency of citizen shareholders that
13

These figures are for the Czech Republic only. The design of the program and bidding for first-wave
companies took place before the breakup of Czechoslovakia in January 1993. There was no second wave
in Slovakia following the split.
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would oppose any attempt at renationalization and that would support the government’s further
proposals for market development. The Czech program balanced these considerations by setting
the cost of a voucher booklet at 1,030 CSK (35 USD or about 1.5 times an average weekly
wage), so that the decision to participate was not trivial, yet virtually every adult citizen could
afford to participate.
The principle of requir ing active decision making was extended more generally in the
Czech design: those who chose to participate were then faced with a subsequent series of real
decisions, for which they themselves would earn the reward or bear the responsibility. The
choices included a) investing in companies directly by participating in several rounds of bidding
the voucher points; b) placing points with a fund, in which case a particular IPF had to be chosen
from among over 400 that were established, many of which offered different types of put options
or other features meant to attract investors; or c) some combination of the two. Such experiences
may have enhanced the participants’ understanding of reform policies and of the workings of the
market economy, and they may have increased their psychological stake in the success of the
reform process. 14
A final aspect of the voucher privatization design that is important for our political
analysis concerns the trading regime after shares have been distributed. From the outset of the
voucher privatization process in the Czech Republic and elsewhere, one of the critical
uncertainties was whether or how quickly citizens would try to cash in their shares after they
were distributed. While exchange of shares can lead to desirable concentration and improved
matching of ownership and assets, and more generally increase the perceived value of share

14

The procedure for allocating shares may also have been designed with political impact in mind: in
cases of excess demand for a company’s shares (up to 120 percent), priority was given to individual over
institutional investors. See Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Earle (1993) or Coffee (1996) for more extensive
discussion.
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ownership, the illiquidity of markets raised the possibility of financial crisis, exacerbated by the
excessive put options offered by some IPFs to lure investors. An additional consideration,
especially important from the perspective of this paper, is that the sale of shares might remove
the incentives of the citizenry to oppose renationalization and support further reform. 15 In the
end, the Czech government delayed trading only for a few months. 16

4. PRIVATIZATION AND ATTITUDES
The design of the Czech privatization program gave Czech citizens direct personal
contact with a major element of the economic reform program and left most participants
somewhat better off than they were before. How might these experiences have affected the way
individuals thought about reform, markets, and democracy? In this section we discuss several
possible channels or mechanisms through which such attitudes might have been positively
affected.

Although each channel is conceptually distinct, empirically they are difficult to

separate. Thus our model of attitudinal formation presented in the following section does not
attempt to distinguish among them. 17
A first possible channel for privatization to impact attitudes is narrowly defined material
self- interest: the privatization program may have developed a set of stakeholders who would see

15

Schmidt (2000) considers this effect in a theoretical model. Although our evidence, discussed below,
provides substantial support for the hypothesis that those who have retained shares tend to be more proreform, we are not prepared to accept his recommendation that share trading be limited or taxed in
transitional economies for this reason, since it ignores the benefits to be derived from financial market
development.
16
There was a six-month delay in the distribution of shares after the end of the first wave in December
1992, connected to disputes over assets (including gold reserves) in the Czech-Slovak divorce. Shares
from the second wave were distributed shortly after it concluded.
17
The mechanisms discussed in this section pertain to the conceptual effects of privatization experiences
on individual attitudes, but it is possible that privatization was not purely exogenous or that it was
correlated with some other variables that also affect attitudes. These econometric identification issues are
discussed in Section 7, together with the estimation results.
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their own interests as tied to further reform. Restitution greatly expanded the set of owners of
real property in the Czech Republic, as voucher privatization did the number of owners of
financial assets (we provide precise estimates in the next section). The incentives of these
groups may have been changed by privatization in favor of an increased role for markets and a
diminished economic role for the state. While Citrin and Greene (1990), in a review of the
literature, conclude that most studies in the American context show that self- interest plays a very
minor role in the determination of political attitudes, the significant exceptions they note involve
cases where the costs and benefits of policies are clear, i.e., where information is available on
which policy preferences can be based.
Such an enhancement of information is a second possible channel through which political
attitudes might have been affected by experiences with privatization.

Uncertainty is a

fundamental problem for individuals involved in any reform process: even if it is known that the
outcome will ultimately be beneficial to most individuals, uncertainty concerning the distribution
of the costs and benefits of the process may serve as an “ex ante political constraint” (Roland
1994).18 The Czech privatization programs may have helped to reduce uncertainty over the
outcomes of the reform process by requiring active participation from the citizenry; mass
privatization increased the incentives of all citizens to compete in acquiring information on the
different enterprises and investment funds in which they could invest, and restitution did the
same for restituents with respect to the uses of their returned property. To the extent that the
information thus acquired increased optimism about the overall course of reform, mass
privatization may have also built support for further reform due to “sociotropic” (Kinder and
Kiewiet 1979) preferences of individuals over the broader economic environment, regardless of
18

For the role of uncertainty in determining support for economic reforms, see Fernandez and Rodrik
(1991), Roland (1994), Rodrik (1995), Dewatripont and Roland (1995), and Roland (2000, Ch. 2).
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their inability to forecast the outcome of reform for their own pocketbooks, as well as provided a
basis for positive “retrospective” evaluations (Fiorina 1981) of the government. 19
Third, and closely related to the previous channel, is the role of the privatization program
in helping to legitimate the early phase of the transition. 20 By opening the process to all citizens
and providing relatively equal opportunities for them to participate, the Czech government may
have increased the perceptions of fairness and transparency of the program. The absence of
preferences given to managers and employees of enterprises and the relative lack of
opportunities for nomenklatura or “spontaneous” privatization in the Czech program (as we
discussed above) stand in stark contrast to the practice in most other East European countries.
Although it would obviously be an exaggeration to say that the Czech restitution and voucher
programs contained no possibilities for favoritism, self-dealing, or corruption, the immediate
outcome was determined to a substantial extent by the choices of the citizens themselves, an
impact which they could sense and for which they had to take a measure of responsibility. By so
doing, the program may also have increased what Lane (1986) calls the “sense of deservedness,”
that “the self is to credited or blamed for one’s own fate,” which would have served both to
legitimate the outcome of the massive property transfers and to instill one of the important values
of the market economy. Furthermore, such participatory factors may have enhanced support not
only for market economic reforms but also for democratization, by increasing trust in both
processes.
Fourth, it is possible that the beneficiaries of privatization may have felt gratitude for the
system or the set of policies to which they give credit for having proposed and implemented the

19

For recent evidence that economic retrospective voting plays a role in congressional elections in the
U.S.A., see Kiewiet and Udell (1998).
20
Our usage of legitimacy draws upon Dye’s (1990) discussion of the role of process in legitimating
outcomes.
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policy.

The Czech privatization program, as in other transition countries, involved the

redistribution of a large fraction of the nation’s wealth, so there would be ample scope for
feelings of appreciation. 21
Finally, it is important to emphasize that our motivation for hypothesizing that these mechanisms
worked to increase support for reforms, markets, and democracy rests on our focus on the initial phase of
the transition in the Czech Republic. Our survey data were collected in January 1996, well prior to the
allegations of corruption associated with the privatization of some companies that helped to ultimately
bring down the Klaus government. These allegations were primarily concerned with privatization deals
involving tenders or direct sales and not the voucher or restitution programs, but it is nonetheless quite
possible that the privatization-attitudes relationship explored in this paper may have changed in more
recent years. Public opinion concerning privatization may also have been negatively influenced by
perceptions of poor corporate governance, fostered by weak financial market regulation and the
“tunneling” activities of some investment privatization funds. However, during the initial phase of
allocation of ownership and trading in shares, the time period of our study, these problems had not yet
surfaced.

5. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF ATTITUDINAL FORMATION
Privatization experiences may influence attitudes through any combination of the
mechanisms discussed in the previous section. For a number of practical reasons, we do not
attempt to distinguish among them. First, our dependent variables generally consist of abstract
preferences over economic and political issues, while our independent variables of interest
simply measure participation in the priva tization program, as discussed in detail in the following
section. Thus (with the exception of one question), we do not observe the impact of privatization
21

Gratitude may be stronger in generating support for the particular politicians or political parties whose
actions created benefits, rather than for the overall policy strategy or ideology as a whole, but it is
possible that the two types of attitudes are correlated.
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experiences on incentives, information, legitimacy, or gratitude, and so we perform a reducedform analysis relating indicators of those experiences directly to abstract preferences. Second,
while our dependent variables may appear to provide some power for distinguishing among the
alternative mechanisms, in fact the measures are so highly correlated that this procedure would
not be persuasive. Our focus in this paper is on the broad question of the impact of privatization
on reform attitudes, and we leave the question of the relative importance of particular
mechanisms to future research.
To test our hypotheses on the relationships between attitudes and experiences of
privatization, we employ as dependent variables attitudinal indicators consisting of ordered
categories of responses to questions on economic and political issues. The key right-hand side
variables on which we focus are the measures of experience of the privatization process, but we
control for a variety of other characteristics of the individual and his/her family.
Formally, we assume that each individual, indexed by subscript “i,” possesses welldefined attitudes (subsuming preferences, values, beliefs, expectations, and evaluations) on
issues such as the course and expected future consequences of economic reforms, the proper role
of the state and markets in the economy, the legitimacy of reform, and democratic values. In our
notation, Yi* alternatively denotes these different attitudes of individual i. We further assume
that each attitude may be expressed as a linear function, common across individuals, of the
individual’s privatization experiences, Zi , and of other characteristics, Xi :
Yi* = Ziγ + Xiβ + ε i ,

(1)

where
Yi* = attitude (alternatively, views towards various aspects of reform, markets, democracy),
Zi = vector of privatization experiences (restitution, voucher privatiza tion),
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Xi = vector of personal characteristics (income, gender, age, education, and Prague residency),
β , γ = vectors of parameters to be estimated, and
ε i = unobserved residual. 22
We are interested in estimating γ, the impact of Z on Y*, and testing the hypothesis that γ
is significantly different from zero. The privatization variables in Z are qualitative variables,
equal to 1 if the individual had the particular experience (received property in restitution,
participated in voucher privatization, or retained shares from voucher privatization) and 0
otherwise, so that γ reflects the difference between individuals who had the experience and those
who did not. If we scale Y* such that larger values imply greater support for reform, markets,
and democracy, then we are interested in the possibility that γ is positive for variables reflecting
experiences such as receipt of property in restitution, participation in voucher privatization, and
retention of shares.
The estimation problem here and in most studies of attitudes, of course, is that we cannot
observe Y* directly. As we describe below, the attitudinal indicators in our data set consist of
the responses of individuals to statements reflecting positions on the course of reforms, on the
roles of markets and the state in the economy, on the legitimacy of the transition, and on
democracy. Respondents were requested to indicate their agreement or disagreement, “strongly”
or “somewhat,” with the statement. We assign values from 0 to 3 to these four categories.
Therefore, the data can be treated as though we observe a qualitative variable Y, with four
categories as follows:
Yi = 0 if Yi* ≤ 0

22

(“not at all” or “strongly disagree”)

The assumption that εi is uncorrelated with Zi is discussed in Section 7 below.
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= 1 if 0 < Yi* ≤ µ1

(“a little” or “rather disagree”)

= 2 if µ1 < Yi* ≤ µ2

(“somewhat” or “rather agree”)

= 3 if µ2 < Yi*

(“very much” or “strongly agree”)

(2)

where µ1 and µ2 represent the common “thresholds” across which individuals switch categories,
with 0 < µ1 < µ2 . Together with the β and γ vectors, the category thresholds are parameters to be
estimated by the model. 23 Under the conventional assumption that ε is distributed as a standard
normal [ε ~ N(0, 1)], we can compute the probabilities of an observation falling within each
category as a function of the Xi and Zi :
Pr (Yi = 0) = Pr (Xiβ + Ziγ + ε i ≤ 0) = Φ(- Xiβ - Ziγ)
Pr (Yi = 1) = Pr (0 < Xiβ + Ziγ + ε i ≤ µ1 ) = Φ(µ1 - Xiβ - Ziγ) - Φ(- Xiβ - Ziγ)

(3)

Pr (Yi = 2) = Pr (µ1 < Xiβ + Ziγ + ε i ≤ µ2 ) = Φ(µ2 - Xiβ - Ziγ) - Φ(µ1 - Xiβ - Ziγ)
Pr (Yi = 3) = Pr (µ2 < Xiβ + Ziγ + ε i ) = 1 - Φ(µ2 - Xiβ - Ziγ),
where Pr stands for probability, and Φ(ω) for the cumulative standard normal distribution from
-∞ to ω. The parameters of the Y* function as well as the category thresholds can then be
estimated using maximum likelihood, where the contribution of any single individual to the
likelihood function is simply given by the formula for the probability of observing him/her in the
observed category, conditional upon his/her characteristics.
Besides estimating the β and γ parameters, and drawing inferences about the statistical
significance of the estimates, we are interested in calculating the implied magnitude of the
impact of Z on Y. Our primary method for doing so is policy simulations, using the predicted
probabilities of observing an individual choosing each of the categories under different

23

The ordered specification assumes that Y i * is a monotonic function of the variables of interest; we
examine the conformity of the data with this assumption in Section 7 below.

19

conditioning assumptions. For instance, take the case where Z is a single dichotomous variable
(in practice, all our measures of Z are qualitative indicators). We may compute the probability
that an individual i chooses category j conditional on her/his other characteristics (Xi), separately
for Zi = 0 and Zi = 1: Pr (Yi = j | Xi ; Zi = 0) and Pr (Yi = j | Xi ; Zi = 1) for each category j (j =
0, 1, 2, 3). Defining these two estimated probabilities as Pij0 and Pij1 , respectively, a prediction of
the conditional incidence of category j can be derived in each case:24

Pj

z=0

= (

1
) ∑ Pij 0 and
n i

(4)

Pj

z=1

= (

1
) ∑ P ij 1
n
i

(5)

The impact of Z on Y can then be summarized as the difference in the distribution of the
four mean probabilities (associated with the four categories of Y) across states Z = 0 and Z = 1.
As partial measures of this impact, we examine the following two indicators:

Elasticity of “strong support” with respect to

Elasticity of “support” with respect to

Z =

Z =

P3 z =1 − P3 z = 0
P3 z =0

P3 z = 1 + P2 z = 1 − P3 z = 0 − P2 z = 0
P3 z = 0 + P2 z = 0

(6)

(7)

The elasticity of “strong support” measures the predicted proportionate increase in the incidence
of category 3 associated with the change from Z = 0 to Z = 1 for the whole sample, and the
elasticity of “support” shows the analogous response in categories 2 and 3.

We call them

elasticities because they are scaled by the predicted incidence under the baseline of Z = 0; thus

24

If we estimate the Pr(Yi | Xi , Zi ) function by maximum likelihood, then these are also the maximum
likelihood predictors, and as such are consistent and asymptotically efficient. See Cramer (1991, p. 86).
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they are discrete counterparts to the conventional formulation of the “marginal effects” relating
continuous variables.
Our method thus permits us to quantify the magnitude of an attitudinal shift associated
with a change in a variable of interest. There are three main advantages over conventional
calculations of marginal effects.

First, as just noted, our procedure is appropriate when

variables—both dependent and independent—are qualitative, as they frequently are in analyses
of attitudes.

The procedure is easily extended to handle the case of unordered multiple

categories of the dependent variable. Second, our method permits the control variables, Xi, to
assume their true values. Unlike many packaged procedures, which set other characteristics at
their sample mean values, our procedure is to simulate the estimated equation for each individual
separately. The simulation results thus quantify the impact of changing the variable of interest
on the sample as a whole, rather than merely for an individual with either average or some prespecified set of characteristics. Finally, our method provides an easy-to- interpret measure of the
marginal effect of any determinant of interest: results are presented in terms of the proportions of
individuals in each category of the original dependent variable. The method is general and may
be applied in a wide variety of other circumstances.

6. DATA
Our data are drawn from a nationwide survey that is part of an ongoing series called the
“Surveys of Economic Expectations and Attitudes” (EEA), organized by the Institute of
Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences in January 1996. The sampling methodology
involved two steps: 1) stratification by settlement size and region, and 2) quota sampling by age,
gender, and education. The procedure assured that the sample is quite representative of the
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Czech population (as we demonstrate below). 25 Of the 1,800 individuals aged 18 and over who
were approached, 1,459 respondents were ultimately interviewed by STEM, the Center for
Empirical Surveys. In addition to the usual set of questions in the EEA series on political and
economic attitudes and on individual and household characteristics, the January 1996
questionnaire contained several special sections, which we designed, requesting detailed
information on the experience of the respondent with restitution and vouche r privatization.
Table 1 shows our selected indicator variables for economic and political attitudes.
Variables are grouped in three broad categories in which we examine them in subsequent
sections: evaluation of economic reform and its consequences, attitudes towards economic
policies and systems, and perceptions of legitimacy and democratic values. Except for the
“preferred economic system” variable, there are four admissible responses, which take on values
from 0 to 3.26 In order to facilitate the reading of results throughout the paper, we have inverted
some answers so that the indicator is consistently larger if it reflects agreement with a more “proreform” statement (or disagreement with an anti-reform statement); in those cases, a “not” is
inserted in the questions marked with an “*” in the table. 27
Although they are inherently and inevitably subjective in nature, the indicators should be
taken as proxies for the underlying preferences of individuals. We hope that by examining a
range of measures, including groups of alternative measures of similar concepts, we may be able
to obtain consistent, robust evidence concerning the hypothesized relationships, although each

25

Unfortunately, no census or residence registration lists were available from which a fully random
sample could have been drawn.
26
Although the structure of the preferred economic system question is different from the others, the
responses do have a natural ordering (from much to little state intervention); thus, we also use ordered
probit techniques for analyzing this variable’s determinants.
27
The original questions, therefore, do not contain the awkward wording of the asterisked questions in
table 1. We have inserted “not” merely to facilitate interpretation of results.
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question on its own may be somewhat problematic. 28 Furthermore, as long as the questions are
not systematically misinterpreted by respondents in a manner which is correlated also with the
independent variables on which we focus, any noise can be treated as pure measurement error. 29
Table 2 provides a summary of survey respondents’ experiences with the restitution
program, our first independent variable of interest: 18.1 percent of respondents reported that their
family received some asset through restitution, with the primary asset returned a farmstead,
farmland, or forestland. 30 In contrast, participation in the voucher privatization program was
quite high, as can be seen in table 3. In each of the two waves of voucher privatization,
approximately 85 percent of those eligible to participate did so, though only 78.6 percent
participated in both waves. 31 Among first-wave participants, 69.2 percent of individuals invested
at least half their points in IPFs, while 56.9 percent of second-wave participants did so.
Approximately half of all participants surveyed had not sold any of their shares as of January
1996, and fully four-fifths of participants retained some of the shares they received from voucher
privatization.

28

The survey contained a number of other attitudinal indicators that we also investigated. Here we
present results for those variables we judge to be most clearly formulated and easiest to interpret, but the
qualitative conclusions are consistent with other indicators as well.
29
This is not strictly accurate, as we employ nonlinear estimation techniques: bias from omitting a
relevant variable (such as a measure of the tendency towards certain interpretations or responses) can
arise even if it is uncorrelated with the right-hand side variables of interest. We attempt to correct for
any systematic interpretational differences by controlling for observable individual characteristics.
30
Our analysis of data from an earlier survey suggests that this is substantially less than the percentage of
the population that had had property confiscated by the communists. Of the respondents to that survey,
27.6 percent reported that the communist government had nationalized property that had been owned by
their parents, and 34 percent said that property owned by themselves, their parents, or their grandparents
had been confiscated.
31
This is slightly higher than the participation rate—77 percent and 79 percent in the first and second
waves, respectively—that may be calculated using figures from the Ministry of Privatization on the
number of participants taken as a ratio to the adult population [Czech Statistical Office (1993)]. The
citizenship requirement for eligibility (discussed in Section 2, above) might be a possible source of this
discrepancy.
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Finally, table 4 shows sample summary statistics for the income and demographic variables used
as covariates, together with roughly comparable statistics (where available) for the population of all
residents of the Czech Republic. We control for the log of per capita family income (which seems less
likely to suffer from endogeneity than individual income), age, gender, education, and Prague residency,
all of which may be correlated both with attitudes towards reform and the probability of various
privatization experiences.32 As can be seen from table 4, sample statistics generally mirror population
averages: differences largely reflect the fact that only individuals aged 18 and over were surveyed, as well
as the standard tendency for well-educated individuals to be overrepresented in surveys.

7. MODEL SPECIFICATION, ESTIMATION, AND SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents the results from our ordered probit estimations, where we test the
hypothesis that restituents and voucher program participants are more likely to harbor attitudes
sympathetic to economic reform, free markets, and democratic institutions. 33 Our independent
variables of interest are dummy variables for various privatization experiences, based on the data
discussed in the previous section.
Because we do not have any clear hypotheses as to differences in behavior among
restituents who received one type of property over another, and because some of the restituent
groups are quite small, we aggregate the various types and use only a single dummy variable

32

Like many capital cities in postcommunist Europe, Prague has benefited from market reforms
considerably more than has the rest of the country. On generational differences, see Rose and Carnaghan
(1994) for a comparative analysis of a number of East European countries.
33
To assess the degree to which the data conform to the ordered probit assumption of monotonicity in the
response of the latent dependent variable to the independent variables of interest, we also estimated
“parallel regressions” [Long (1997, pp. 140–45)] in which the dependent variable responses were
regrouped into three alternative sets of bivariate categories. For a first simple probit regression, “strongly
disagree” is coded as 0 and “rather disagree,” “rather agree,” and “strongly agree” are grouped together
and coded as 1; for a second, “strongly disagree” and “rather disagree” are coded as 0 and “rather agree”
and “strongly agree” as 1; for a third, “strongly disagree,” “rather disagree,” and “rather agree” are coded
as 0 and “strongly agree” as 1. The results from these alternative specifications were qualitatively similar
to those from the ordered probits, implying that the data do not contradict the monotonicity assumption.
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(“restituent” in tables 5–7) to represent the effect of restitution of property.

Voucher

participation is also defined as a dummy variable (“voucher participant”) equal to 1 if the
individual participated in at least one of the two waves of voucher privatization. The dummy
variable for continued ownership (“retained shares”) equals 1 if the individual still retains any
shares from voucher privatization, and zero if the individual either did not participate or
participated and subsequently sold all her shares. Thus, the latter voucher program variable is
nested in the former: it represents the additional impact of retaining shares, beyond voucher
participation. The sample was restricted to those old enough to have participated in at least the
second wave of voucher privatization.
Additionally, as discussed above, we control for demographic characteristics that might
be correlated both with restitution of property and with the dependent variable. The covariates
are the natural logarithm of family income per capita; a dummy variable equal to 1 for male
(zero for female); years of age; vocational, secondary, and university education dummies (where
elementary education is the omitted category); and a dummy for Prague residency. We report
the estimates of the impact of restitution and voucher program participation, including the
simulation elasticities, for each of the three categories of attitudinal variables considered in this
paper: evaluation of economic reform, opinions on economic policies and systems, and
perceptions of legitimacy and democratic values.
Table 5 displays the ordered probit equation estimates where the dependent variable is
one of three indicators of an individual’s evaluation of economic reform.

For all three

questions—“satisfied with economic reform,” “believe economic situation improving,” and
“expect future improvement in family living standards”—participants in the survey who received
property through restitution are more likely to have a positive opinion of economic reform: the
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coefficient on the restitution dummy is positive and statistically significantly different from zero
at the 1 percent level.
With respect to the voucher program, participation in at least one of the two waves is
estimated to have a negligible effect on all three dependent variables. The estimated coefficient
on retained shares in these models, however, is positive and highly significant, and appears to be
nontrivial in magnitude (for instance, compared to the size of the µ’s).

In alternative

specifications, when we omitted the retained shares variable, the estimated coefficient on
voucher participant became statistically significant, taking on a value midway between the
coefficient estimates for voucher participant and retained shares. These results suggest that the
voucher program did have an impact on attitudes towards reform, but that the effect worked
through share retention rather than participation per se.
The simulation results shown at the bottom of the table support the argument that both the
restitution and the voucher program produced not only statistically significant, but also politically
significant, results. Restituent status raises the predicted incidence of support (either “strongly” or
“somewhat” agree) for all three measures from 15 to 26 percent, while the proportionate increase in
support due to participation in voucher privatization and subsequent retention of shares ranges from 0.18
to 0.27. Given the magnitude of the coefficients, it is evident that the large effects from voucher
privatization are almost entirely due to retained shares and not at all to participation. Thus, the data
provide evidence that receipt of property through restitution and continued ownership of shares obtained
through the voucher program are strongly associated with support for economic reform, but that
participation in voucher privatization alone is not.
Table 6 reports the estimates of ordered probit regressions with evaluations of economic
policies—“complete freedom for private enterprise” and “state should not increase price controls”—and
systems (whether the individual supports a socialist, social market, or free market system) as dependent
variables. The results show consistently positive coefficients on the restituent dummy, but both the
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statistical significance of the coefficients and the elasticities implied by the simulations are smaller than in
the first set of dependent variables.

In contrast to the regressions in table 5, voucher participation is estimated to have a
strong positive impact in these models, although its estimated coefficient is statistically
significant at conventional levels only in the case of the first variable: “complete freedom for
private enterprise.” Together, the positive coefficients for voucher participant and retained
shares combine to produce large elasticities of support (ranging from 0.06 to 0.39) for the market
economy as measured by the three dependent variables.

Thus, while the previous table

suggested that only share retention has a big impact on favorable views of reform and its
consequences, the results in this table are consistent with the hypothesis that both participation
and share retention increase support for markets.
The final set of ordered probit estimations are shown in table 7, which reports results with
proxies for perception of legitimacy and democratic values as dependent variables. As might be
expected, restituents are more likely than other respondents to believe that there is “more social
justice today” than under the prior system, as well as to believe that “privatization was not
unfair”; the coefficient on both terms is positive and statistically significant, and elasticities of
support are large. In contrast, while the coefficient is positive in the equation for “no rule by
‘strong hand,’” the result is not precisely estimated, and the implied elasticities are very small.
As with the evaluation of reform, the estimated coefficient on voucher participation is
small and consistently insignificant in all of the models in the third group, but share retention is
estimated to have large, positive effects that are statistically significant in the “more social
justice today” and “no rule by ‘strong hand’” estimations. The estimated elasticities are also
sizable in those two models. It is notable that neither mass privatization participation itself nor
retaining shares enhances belief in the fairness of the privatization process (possibly even non27

participants believe it was fair, knowing that they could have participated), but the experience of
keeping shares is positively associated with belief in increased social justice and with antiauthoritarianism. Thus, even if shareholders may see a need for government regulation of
financial markets (as the results for “complete freedom for private enterprise” hint), they also
appear to be more likely to oppose arbitrary government power, possibly because that could
reduce the value of their investments or because their pro- market and pro-democracy values have
developed in tandem.
As expected, the covariates generally have considerable explanatory power. Income, for
example, is always positively correlated with support for reform, markets, and democracy, and
its coefficient is always significantly different from zero. Men are more optimistic about the
economy, and show greater support for market-oriented economic policies and a free-market
system, but the effect of gender is otherwise not precisely estimated. Age effects are negative
and large in every model except “no rule by ‘strong hand.’” That one exception is consistent
with evidence that supporters of the far-right Republican Party are drawn disproportionately
from the ranks of the disaffected young. Education is consistently associated with pro-reform
attitudes, an effect especially large for university compared to elementary education. Finally,
somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom, Prague residency is only inconsistently associated
with pro-reform attitudes.
A possible objection to our interpretation of the effects of restitution is that our measure
of receipt of property through restitution might be proxying for some third, unmeasured factor
affecting attitudes.

One important possibility is unmeasured aspects of family background.

Respondents whose families were part of the “bourgeoisie” before communism, for instance,
might have been inculcated with more liberal beliefs from an early age, and therefore might be
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more likely to support liberal capitalism and democracy than other individuals, even controlling
for such observable characteristics as age, gender, education, and income. If such individuals are
also more likely to receive property in restitution (because their ancestors were more likely to
have possessed property that was expropriated), then the estimated coefficient on restitution in
our equations would suffer from an upward bias.
Although we are unable to measure such “class” effects directly, a bourgeois background
seems likely to be correlated with entrepreneurship in the family. Our data show that restituents
are, in fact, considerably more likely to either be entrepreneurs themselves or to have family
members who are: 45.4 percent of restituents have some member of their household who is
registered as an entrepreneur, while the same is true for only 27.5 percent of nonrestituents. To
examine the robustness of our results for restitution, therefore, we reestimated our estimations
with a model that included a dummy variable for registration by any household member
(including the respondent) as an entrepreneur.

The effect of restitution holds up in these

estimations, even while registration of a household member as an entrepreneur is often positively
correlated with pro-reform attitudes.

For only one dependent variable—“state should not

increase price controls”—is the estimated coefficient on the restitution dummy statistically
insignificant in the unrestricted model (i.e., including the family member entrepreneurship
dummy) where it is positive and significantly different from zero in the restricted model.
Similarly, one might suspect that individuals who are more optimistic about the economy
would be more likely to retain shares acquired through voucher privatization, and that the
positive association between retention of shares obtained through voucher privatization and proreform attitudes captures this predisposition rather than any change in sentiment resulting from
ownership of shares.

However, only two of our attitudinal indicators measure economic
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optimism per se: “believe economic situation improving” and “expect future improvement in
family living standards.” It is difficult to explain why an individual who felt, for example, that
there was “more social justice today” or favored “no rule by ‘strong hand’” would be inherently
more likely to hold on to shares acquired through voucher privatization. When viewed across all
of the attitudinal measures used, the evidence suggests that retention of shares shaped attitudes,
rather than the converse.
In summary, we find that both restituents of property that had been nationalized by the
Communist regime and voucher program participants who chose to retain their shares are
consistently more supportive of economic reforms and optimistic about their effects, more
inclined to harbor free-market attitudes, and more likely to perceive the transition as legitimate
and (for those who retained shares only) to support democratic values. More ambiguous is the
case of voucher participants who did not retain their shares: such individuals are significantly
and substantially different from nonparticipants only for the dependent variable representing
support for complete freedom for private enterprise.

8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented evidence of an empirical relationship between the
attitudes of individuals toward the economic and political transition, on the one hand, and their
experiences of privatization policies introduced by the Czech government, on the other. In our
sample of 1,459 adult Czech respondents, restituent status and retention of shares acquired
through the voucher program both have significant predictive power for attitudes which may be
characterized as pro-reform. Through a variety of possible channels—perhaps because they have
acquired a vested interest in continued progress towards a market economy, because their
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participation has enhanced their understanding and trust in the reform process, or because they
are grateful to the government that arranged the privatization program in such a way as to make
them the beneficiaries—these new owners of property are more likely to appraise past reform
efforts positively, to expect good future developments, to oppose state intervention in the
economy, to believe that the reforms are legitimate, and (for those who retained shares only) to
hold democratic values.

Using an original simulation method, we have shown that the

magnitudes of the impacts of privatization experiences are substantial in terms of the elasticity of
the movement across the categories of most of these dependent variables.
The results have a number of wider implications. First of all, most of the empirical
literature on the effects of the economy on individual attitudes has studied macroeconomic
variables, such as inflation, unemployment, and growth in national income, relating them to
voting for a particular party or for the incumbent versus the challenger in presidential elections.34
Other studies have emphasized the role of sociodemographic characteristics—such as age,
gender, education, occupation, and income—on attitudes. 35 While such analyses have their own
intrinsic interest, their usefulness to policymakers is limited since macroeconomic variables and
demographic characteristics are not policy instruments that can easily be controlled. From a
Machiavellian point-of- view, what the Prince or Princess (at least a democratic one) would like
to know is how to design policies to strengthen his/her political base, or indeed whether policy
design can affect the attitudes of the citizenry whatsoever. Our work thus sheds light on issues

34

For an extensive study of Western democracies, see Lewis-Beck (1988). In the transition context, see
Przeworski (1996) for a study of the effects of unemployment, inflation, and wage levels on support for
the Balcerowicz program in Poland. Another approach [e.g. Whitefield and Evans (1994), Evans and
Whitefield (1995)] relates support for democracy (the dependent variable) to subjective evaluations of the
political and economic situation (the independent variables), rather than, as we do here, to the actual
experiences of policies.
35
The classic reference in American politics is Campbell et al. (1960).
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of tactics and leadership, demonstrating both the political opportunities and the political
constraints that policymakers face in their policy design decisions. 36
Second, we find that the transition context is both an apt and a fascinating setting in
which to investigate these issues. Seldom in world history have democratic policymakers faced
both the opportunity and the conundrum that privatization represented to the East European
leaders coming to power in the early 1990s. In some ways, the chance to implement such a
program must be the dream of every politician out to buy votes with pork barrel or worse, and of
course policymakers in the transition countries also had some awareness of the importance of
privatization in improving economic performance, at least in the long run. At the same time,
designing privatization policy was a daunting challenge to face, full of invisible political and
economic pitfalls. As we have shown, the designs of the restitution and voucher programs in the
Czech Republic contained specific elements that in purely political terms served to maximize
their positive impact and to minimize their negative consequences. Their history provides a
useful case study of policymaking under political and economic uncertainty: Klaus and his
colleagues were either politically adept or, if one is unwilling to impute intentionality, extremely
lucky. 37
Finally, our work provides some support for viewing attitudes themselves as an important
element in the large-scale institutional change of transition.

Like institutions, attitudes of

individuals toward alternative policies carry consequences, for instance for the sustainability of a
reform process, and they carry some persistence in that habitual ways of thinking (what East
36

Shleifer and Treisman (2000) discuss tactics by which stakeholders might be encouraged to support
economic reforms. Issues of tactics in designing social safety nets during democratic transitions are
covered by Nelson (1992) and Graham (1994).
37
It would be interesting to test the persistence of the relationships estimated in this paper in light of
Klaus’s subsequent fall from power in 1997 amid privatization-related scandals (that were, however,
largely unrelated to the restitution and voucher programs) and his reemergence as a significant political
actor in the 1998 parliament elections, but that would take us beyond the scope of this paper.

32

Europeans widely refer to as “the mentality of the people”) are not easily changed. 38 Most
intriguing, however, is that despite their persistence, attitudes toward policies may be susceptible
to influence by the particular design of the policies themselves. In the Czech example, the
restitution and voucher privatization policies adopted at the outset of transition were
fundamentally new, both in form and content: by contrast with economic policy under the
Communist Party, they were largely open, transparent, and competitive (merit-based).
Moreover, as we have emphasized, they involved the population as active participants in the
process, giving them incentives and new opportunities for gain and profit. This paper provides
evidence that these experiences may indeed have given Czech individuals more confidence in the
policies and worked to encourage their support for reform, markets, and democracy.

38

Both Simon (1945) and Nelson and Winter (1982) discuss the possible conceptualization of personal
habits as kinds of institutions. We would add that patterns of thinking may also be habits and that they
also have real consequences. Our approach has parallels in the discussions of “cultural persistence” in the
literature on ethnomethodology; see, e.g., Zucker (1991).
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Table 1 Attitudinal Variables
Attitudinal Question on Surveya

Variable Name
A. Evaluation of Economic Reform

Answers
Definitely
not

Rather
not

Rather
yes

Definitely
yes

Total

Satisfied with economic reform

“Can you say that you are satisfied overall with the course of economic
reform to date?”

188
12.9%

509
35.0%

628
43.1%

131
9.0%

1,456
100.0%

Believe economic situation improving

“Would you characterize the current period as the beginning of a
substantial improvement in our economic situation?”

180
12.4%

470
32.5%

596
41.2%

201
13.9%

1,447
100.0%

Expect improvement in living standards

“Do you think that the new economic situation will bring better living
standards for your family in the near future (approximately in the next two
years)?”

292
20.1%

583
40.1%

453
31.2%

125
8.6%

1,453
100.0%

B. Attitudes towards Economic Policies and Systems
Complete freedom for private enterprise

“It is necessary to leave private enterprise completely free.”

195
13.4%

476
32.7%

500
34.4%

284
19.5%

1,455
100.0%

State should not increase price controls

“The state should not increase the level of price controls.”a

276
19.0%

599
41.2%

442
30.4%

136
9.4%

1,453
100.0%

Socialist
pre-1990

Social
Market

Free
Market

Total

158
10.9%

872
60.3%

416
28.8%

1,446
100.0%

Definitely
not

Rather
not

Rather
yes

Definitely
yes

Total

“Today’s system is more socially just than the previous (until 1989) one.”

303
21.0%

520
36.0%

461
31.9%

159
11.0%

1,443
100.0%

“Do you think that privatization does not mean the transfer of assets
primarily to the wrong hands?”a

273
18.9%

535
36.9%

535
36.9%

105
7.3%

1,448
100.0%

277
19.1%

453
31.3%

454
31.3%

265
18.3%

1,449
100.0%

Preferred economic systemb

“Which economic system do you p refer?”

C. Perceptions of Legitimacy and Democratic Values
More social justice today
Privatization not unfair

No rule by “strong hand”

“It would not be better for our country if, instead of discussion about the
various possibilities for resolving the current situation, there were a
government of a strong hand and somebody clearly said what should be
done.”a

Note: a The questions in quotation marks are exact translations from the survey questionnaire, with the exception of those marked with an a , which are inverted so that stronger
agreement reflects a more pro-reform attitude. bAnswer definitions: Socialist pre-1990 = “Socialist, as in our country until 1989;” social market = “Social market, where the state influences
the economy to a marked degree;” free market = “Free market economy, with minimal state intervention.”
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Table 2 Property Received through Restitution
Number of
Respondents

Type of Property Received
Business
Real estate
Financial Assets
Farmstead, farmland, forest
Nothing

14
38
31
180
1,191

41

Percent
of Total
1.0
2.6
2.1
12.4
81.9

Table 3 Participation in Voucher Privatization
Participation in Voucher Privatization
(of those eligible)
First Wave

Number
1,189

Percent
84.6

Second Wave

1,182

84.2

Neither Wave

116

8.3

185

13.2

1,103

78.6

One of Two Waves
Both Waves

Points Invested in IPFs (of participants)
None
< 1/2
About 1/2
> 1/2
All
Shares Sold (of participants)
None
< 1/2
About 1/2
> 1/2
All

First Wave
Number
Percent
327
27.5

Second Wave
Number
Percent
458
38.7

39

3.3

52

4.4

113

9.5

98

8.3

34

2.9

33

2.8

674

56.8

541

45.8

Number
678

Percent
52.7

91

7.1

209

16.3

60

4.7

248

19.3
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Table 4 Income and Demographic Characteristics of Sample and Population
Variable
Income (mean [S.D.])

Sample

Population

5,699 (4,681)

N/A

Sample N
1,430

Age (mean [S.D.])

44.2 (15.8)

37.0

1,459

Male %

47.3

48.6

690

Female %

52.7

51.4

769

Elementary education %

22.6

26.0

330

Vocational education %

36.3

39.0

529

Secondary education %

29.6

27.1

432

University education %

11.5

7.9

168

Prague resident %
Non-Prague resident %

13.0
87.0

11.8
88.2

189
1,270

Sources for Population Statistics: UNDP/Charles University report Zpráva o lidském rozvoji: Ceská republika 1996 for average age; winter 1996
Labor Force Survey for education; and Czech Statistical Office, 1995 Czech Statistical Yearbook for gender and Prague residency.
Notes: Income in Czech Koruna is total family monthly income per capita, calculated as (wage income + entrepreneurial income + social insurance
+ child support + alimony + gifts + other assistance + withdrawals from savings) / number of family members. Individuals aged 18 and over were
surveyed. Population statistics for education are computed for individuals 15 years of age or older.
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Table 5 Privatization Experiences and Evaluation of Economic Reform: Ordered Probit Estimates
(Significance levels: 10% - *; 5% - **; 1% - ***)
Satisfied with
economic reform

Believe economic
situation improving

Expect future improvement
in family living standards

Estimated
coefficient

Standard
error

Estimated
coefficient

Standard
error

Estimated
coefficient

Standard
error

-1.97***

0.48

-1.81***

0.47

-3.12***

0.45

0.36***

0.08

0.23***

0.08

0.28***

0.08

0.12

0.05

0.12

0.01

0.12

0.26***

0.07

0.20***

0.08

0.25***

0.08

Ln (family income per capita)

0.39***

0.06

0.37***

0.06

0.51***

0.05

Male

0.07

0.06

0.10*

0.06

0.20***

0.06

0.00

-0.02***

0.00

Independent variables
Constant
Privatization experiences
Restituent
Voucher participant
Retained shares

-0.04

Controls

Age

-0.01***

0.00

-0.01***

Vocational education

0.11

0.08

0.08

0.08

0.01

0.08

Secondary education

0.29***

0.09

0.29***

0.09

0.27***

0.09

University education

0.42***

0.12

0.30***

0.11

0.45***

0.12

Prague resident

0.01

0.09

0.11

0.08

µ(1)

1.17***

0.05

1.10***

0.05

1.23***

0.04

µ (2)
Maximized log likelihood

2.71***

0.06

2.41***

0.06

2.50***

0.06

-0.05

0.09

Thresholds

1,556.33

χ statistic
Valid N
2

-1,636.98
165.76

197.03
1,371

-1,589.37
272.37

1,362

1,369

Simulation results: relative impact of privatization experiences on support for reform
support
Restituent
Participant and retained shares

0.26
0.18

strong support

support

strong support

0.81
0.47

0.15
0.20

0.39
0.48

support
0.26
0.27

Note: Omitted categories for dummy variables: nonrestituent, nonparticipant, nonshareholder, female, elementary education, non-Prague resident.

strong support
0.57
0.55

Table 6 Privatization Experiences and Attitudes towards Economic Policies and Systems: Ordered Probit Estimates
(Significance levels: 10% - *; 5% - **; 1% - ***)
Complete freedom for
private enterprise

Independent variables
Constant

Estimated
coefficient

Standard
error

-0.87*

0.50

State should not increase
price controls
Estimated
coefficient

Preferred economic
system

Standard
error

Estimated
coefficient

Standard
error

-1.09**

0.50

-1.80***

0.57

Privatization experiences
Restituent

0.17**

0.08

0.17**

0.08

0.17**

0.09

Voucher participant

0.23*

0.12

0.16

0.13

0.13

0.13

Retained shares

0.00

0.08

0.19**

0.08

0.16**

0.08

Ln (family income per capita)

0.22***

0.06

0.22***

0.06

0.38***

0.07

Male

0.15***

0.06

0.26***

0.06

0.30***

0.07

Age

-0.01***

0.00

-0.01***

0.00

-0.02***

0.00

Vocational education

0.21***

0.08

0.27***

0.08

0.24***

0.09

Secondary education

0.20**

0.09

0.48***

0.09

0.50***

0.10

University education

0.22**

0.11

0.78***

0.11

0.70***

0.13

0.09

0.41***

0.09

0.20**

0.10

2.07***

0.06

Controls

Prague resident

-0.07

Thresholds
µ (1)

1.06***

0.04

1.26***

0.05

µ (2)

2.03***

0.05

2.44***

0.06

Maximized log likelihood
χ2statistic

-1,771.71
77.55

Valid N

1,370

-1,606.59
255.07

-1,103.41
252.69

1,370

1,366

Simulation results: relative impact of privatization experiences on support for reform
support

strong support

support

strong support

support

Restituent

0.13

0.26

0.16

0.31

0.03

0.19

Participant and retained shares

0.19

0.39

0.39

0.81

0.06

0.39

Note: Omitted categories for dummy variables: nonrestituent, nonparticipant, nonshareholder, female, elementary education, non-Prague resident.

strong support

Table 7 Privatization Experiences, Perceptions of Legitimacy, and Democratic Values: Ordered Probit Estimates
(Significance levels: 10% - *; 5% - **; 1% - ***)
More social
justice today
Independent variables
Constant

Privatization not
unfair

Estimated
coefficient

Standard
error

-1.44***

0.48

0.28***

0.07

Estimated
coefficient
-0.33

No rule by
“strong hand”

Standard
error

Estimated
coefficient

Standard
error

0.48

-0.56

0.50

0.08

0.02

0.08

Privatization experiences
Restituent
Voucher participant

0.12

-0.13

0.13

0.03

0.13

0.19**

0.08

0.12

0.08

0.30***

0.08

Ln (family income per capita)

0.29***

0.06

0.16***

0.06

0.12**

0.06

Male

0.08

0.06

0.09

0.06

0.01

0.06

0.00

0.00

0.00

Retained shares

-0.04

0.28***

Controls

Age

-0.01***

0.00

-0.01**

Vocational education

0.07

0.08

0.19***

0.08

0.17**

0.08

Secondary education

0.17**

0.09

0.30***

0.09

0.44***

0.09

University education

0.26**

0.11

0.50***

0.12

0.65***

0.11

Prague resident

0.07

0.09

0.06

0.08

0.22**

0.09

µ(1)

1.05***

0.04

1.10***

0.04

0.93***

0.04

µ (2)
Maximized log likelihood

2.13***

0.06

2.48***

0.06

1.86***

0.05

Thresholds

χ statistic
Valid N
2

-1,713.34

-1,634.07

-1,791.84

120.11

100.84

117.48

1,361

1,365

1,365

Simulation results: relative impact of privatization experiences on support for reform
support
Restituent

0.26

strong support

support

strong support

support

strong support

0.55

0.26

0.66

0.02

0.03

0.31

0.62

Participant and retained shares
0.15
0.29
0.00
-0.01
Note: Omitted categories for dummy variables: nonrestituent, nonparticipant, nonshareholder, female, elementary education, non-Prague resident.

